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DR PFEER'S REBUTTAL
1. The Language of the Amendment.
The Amendment may prohibit any one or more of three
things:
(a) The establishment of a particular church or denomina-
tion, as the Anglican Church in England or the Lutheran Church
in Sweden. Professor O'Neill and I agree that this is barred by
the Amendment.
(b) In addition to (a), the grant of a material benefit to a
particular church or religion withheld from other churches or
religions-?,. e., a sort of equal protection of the laws for religious
bodies.' We agree that this too is encompassed in the Amendment.
(c) In addition to (a) and (b), the grant of material benefits
to all churches or denominations, assuming it were practicable
to effect the grant without prefering any one or more over the
others. Here we disagree. Professor O'Neill argues that the
Amendment goes no further than (a) and (b); I believe it encom-
passes (c) as well.
Professor O'Neill argues that the language of the Amend-
ment does not expressly bar non-preferential support. True;
but neither does it expressly bar only preferential support. If
it did either we would have no debate. The language of the
Amendment is at least as consistent with a bar of non-preferential
support as of preferential support. For if a grant of land to the
Baptists is a law respecting an establishment of religion, even
though it does not confer upon them the dominant status in
church-state relations enjoyed by the Anglicans in England and
the Lutherans in Sweden, why is not also a grant of land to all
denominations likewise a law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion? After all, the Amendment does not say "law respecting
an establishment of a particular religion," or even "of a re-
ligion"; its scope is unparticularized and universal.
Moreover the Amendment bars not only the establishment of
religion, but also laws prohibiting its free exercise; and in the
latter clause it does not use the word "religion" but merely refers
back to the word in the first clause. If religion in the establish-
ment clause is particular, then it must equally be so in the free
exercise clause.
It is undoubtedly true that an established church and prefer-
ential support of favored sects were evils which the Amendment
sought to prevent. It is, however, no less true that they were not
1 1. ,Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, particularly Justice Frandurter's concurrence, 21
LAw WE 4223 (1953).
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the only evils sought to be avoided; if they were, the Senate would
not have twice rejected proposals to word the Amendment specifi-
cally to mention only those evils.
2. The Words and Actions of Jefferson.
(a) The Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Free-
dom: The statute was not limited to "mean that no man shall be
compelled to attend or support any religion ivhatsoever that is
selected for his attendance or support by the government." On
the contrary, the statute not only declares it "sinful and tyranical
to compel a man to furnish contributions for the propogation of
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors," but also that it is
wrong to force him to "support this or that teacher of his own
religious persuasion." 2 The statute was enacted after defeat of
an assessment measure which permitted the taxpayer to select
which denomination was to receive his funds.
(b) Virginia and the federal government: Of course, Jeffer-
son recognized a difference between the powers of the federal
government and those of Virginia. But this does not mean, as
Professor O'Neill urges, that he may well have opposed use of
tax raised funds for religious purposes by Virginia, but not oppose
such use by the federal government. On the contrary, he more
likely would have opposed such use by the federal government,
for to him, as to Jeffersonians generally, the difference between
the powers of the States and of the federal government meant
greater powers for the former and less for the latter, rather than
the converse.3
(c) Jefferson's non-interference with congressional chap-
laincies: This is of little significance in view of Jefferson's well-
known devotion to the principle of the independence of the three
branches of the government and his belief that each branch must
determine for itself the constitutionality of its actions. What
is significant is Jefferson's refusal to issue even non-sectarian
Thanksgiving proclamations because of his belief that such ac-
tions on his part would violate the Constitution.
(d) The "wall of separation" letter to the Danbury Bap-
tists: This letter expresses the ideological foundation of the
First Amendment: the belief "that religion is a matter which lies
between man and his God." It was characterized by a unanimous
Supreme Court in 1878 "almost as an authoritative declaration of
2. 12 LAWS OF VMGINIA 84 (Hening 1823).
3. The Virginia Bill is set forth in full as an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dis-
sent in the Everson case, 330 U. S. 1, 72 (1947).
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the scope and effect of the Amendment. ' 4  The letter was care-
fully drawn, and was submitted to Jefferson's attorney-general
for examination before it was sent. It furnished "an occasion
which [Jefferson] long wished to find of saying why [he did] not
proclaim fastings and Thanksgivings, as [his] predecessors did.'
3. The Words and Actions of Madison.
(a) The Assessment Bill and the Memorial: Madison's
opposition to the Assessment Bill was not based exclusively or
even primarily on the fact that it would establish Christianity in
preference to other religions. This was but one of fifteen reasons
stated in his Memorial for his opposition. The principal reasons-
that religion is not within the cognizance of political society and
that support of religion must always be voluntary-are equally
applicable whether one or all religions are the beneficiaries of
governmental support.
Actually, the Virginia Bill was as close to a non-preferential
measure as could be conceived. True, it mentioned only "Chris-
tain" teachers of religion, and a motion to delete the word
"Christian" lost by a narrow vote. But this was purely symbolic;
there were no non-Christian teachers of religion in Virginia in
1784;1 and if "Jews, Mohametans" or others should later have
come into the state, Washington at least construed the bill so as
to exempt them,7 just as special provision was contained in the
Bill for the "denominations of Quakers and Menonists," who
did not have ministers or teachers of religion. Indeed, the Bill
went further than what would ordinarily be expected of even a
non-preferential measure for religious support, for it permitted
the non-religionists to designate that their tax should be used
"for the encouragement of seminaries of learning . . .and to no
other use or purpose whatsoever."
(b) Virginia and the federal government: As in the case of
Jefferson there is no reason to believe that Madison would oppose
non-preferential support of religion by the Virginian legislature
and not oppose such support by the Congress. Moreover, if, as
Professor O'Neill and I agree, one of the reasons he opposed
governmental support of Christianity in Virginia was that it
established Christianity, why then is not a federal law supporting
religion a "law respecting an establishment of religion"?
4. Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1878).
5. Letter to Levi Lincoln, 9 JmFmEsoN's WRMTINGS 346-347 (Ford ed.).
6. There were probably not a half-dozen Jewish families in the state. U. S.
BUREAU OF CENsus, A CENTURY oF PoPULATioN GROwTH, 1790-1900, 116 (1909);
GOODMAN, AMERCAN OvERTuRE 148-149.
7. 1 SToKEs, CHURCH AM STATE N THE UNITD STATES 390.
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4. The Acts of the Presidents and the Congresses.
These can conveniently be treated together as they all con-
stitute the practical construction argument-undoubtedly the
strongest argument in support of the non-preference theory.
Space restrictions limit me to the following summary comments :"
(a) Violation of oath of office: It is argued that the Presi-
dents who issued Thanksgiving proclamations, etc., and the Con-
gressmen who voted for chaplains, etc., could not conceiveably
have been violating their oaths to uphold the Constitution; ergo,
these acts were constitutional. But acceptance of this argument
would mean that no act of Congress approved by the President
could be judicially declared unconstitutional.
(b) The assumption of constitutionality: Many of the prac-
tices assumed to be constitutional may be no more than immune to
judicial attack. For example, Congressional and military chap-
lains were believed by Madison to be unconstitutional, 9 but under
our system of jurisprudence there is no practical way in which a
judicial declaration of unconstitutionality can be obtained.10 So,
too, there is no way to test judicially the constitutional validity of
Presidential thanksgiving proclamations, or the placing of "In
God We Trust" on our coins.
(c) The vestiges of establishment: When the attention paid
to religious matters by the Continental Congress is considered, it
is hardly surprising that a few vestigial remnants should continue.
What is significant is, as I have indicated in my main article, how
few and comparatively minor these vestiges actually were.
(d) The pressure of politics: In view of the wrath which is
visited upon those in political life who refuse to make at least
ceremonial obeisance to orthodoxy, it is quite natural that few
Presidents would make an issue of so seemingly minor an issue
as Thanksgiving proclamations. Strong-willed ones, such as
Jefferson and Jackson, braved sectarian wrath and remained
steadfast to their convictions of unconstitutionality; but even
Jefferson attended chaplain's services in Congress because, in the
words of a contemporary, "The political necessity of paying some
respect to the religion of the country is felt.' Madison admitted
that he proclaimed thanksgivings because of political considera-
8. For a fuller discussio nsee my article, Church and State: Something Less thanSeparation, 19 Cir. L. RE . 1, 22 (1951), and Chapter 5 of my forthcoming book,
Church, State and Freedom.
9. Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 WILLIAM & MARY QuARTEmLy 534,
558-599 (1946).
10. Elliott v. White, 23 F. 2d 997 (D. C. Cir. 1928) ; cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon,262 U. S. 447 (1923) ; Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952) ; Bull v.Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, aff'd, 298 N. Y. 516 (1948).
11. STOKES, op. cit. supra n. 7 at 500
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tions though he believed his act unconstitutional. To appease his
conscience, he issued the proclamations in non-sectarian terms, as
had Washington; but Adams piously called for a Christian wor-
ship, although he would later privately write to Jefferson:
"Twenty times in the course of my late reading, have I been on the
point of breaking out, 'This would be the best of all possible
worlds, if there were no religion in it.''
(e) Inconsistent practices: If Thanksgiving proclamations
are incofisistent with the view that the First Amendment bars
non-preferential support of religion, Adams' proclamation is
equally inconsistent with the view that it bars only preferential
support. Similarly, the several references in Professor O'Neill's
article 4o Congressional expenditures for missionaries to Chris-
tianize the Indians are likewise inconsistent with the non-prefer-
ence theory, since such expenditures are obviously preferential
I find it difficult to reconcile these two sentences in Professor
O'Neill's main article: "The federal government spent large sums
of money appropriated by Congress in support of Christian mis-
sionaries to the Indians. The United States government is still
using federal funds for im.partial support of religious activities.'11
(f) Tax exemption: I agree that much (though not all) of
the tax exemption granted to religious institutions is inconsistent
with the interpretation of. the First Amendment set forth in the
Everson and McCollum decisions. But the unconstitutionality of
tax exemptions to religious institutions was recognized by many
constitutional authorities and writers long before the Everson
and McCollum decisions.14 Even so conservative a writer as
Zollman stated: "(W)hile charity and education may be said to be
established in the policy of the state, an establishment of religion
is expressly prohibited by the Federal Constitution and impliedly
by all but one of the State constitutions. The strictly religious
features of church societies can therefore furnish no valid reason
for this exemption.' "5
(g) The testimony of non-support: With the exception of
tax exemption-which, I concede, is substantial-the instances of
12. 10 Wonics OF JoHx ADAmS 254 (1858).
13. Italics added.
14. See, e. g., ADLR, Historical Origins of the Exemption from Taxation of
Charitable Institutions in TAX Exm mpro-Ns ON REAL ESTATE 76 (1922) ; Stinson, The
Exemption of Churches from Taxation, 18 TAXES 364 (1940) ; Stimson, The Exemption
of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REv. 422 (1934). In the
last cited article the author writes: "Since the fundamental laws that have been accepted
in the United States provide for separation of Church and State, and since the exemption
of church property from taxation constitutes a subsidy to the church associations, it is
clear that what has been expressly prohibited is being indirectly carried on and that the
courts and a large part of the public are sanctioning it."
15. ZOLLuAN, Ami cAi CHuRcH LAw 327.
